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While Latin America’s trade with China is flourishing again, and China’s 
government is courting Latin America, the European Union risks being 
outpaced. This is demonstrated by new cooperation initiatives within the 
framework of the second China–CELAC forum, which took place in Santiago 
de Chile on 21–22 January 2018. By contrast, the third summit between the 
European Union and CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States), originally scheduled for October 2017, was postponed indefinitely.
 • China has displaced Europe as the second-most important trade partner of 
Latin America behind the United States; in some of the region’s countries it has 
even become the most important trade partner. To further expand trade, the 
Chinese government invited Latin American governments to join the Road and 
Belt Initiative (RBI).
 • European foreign direct investment (FDI) is still much more important in Latin 
America than Chinese FDI. But China is expanding and diversifying its invest-
ments in the region, and it has become an important lender.
 • China’s relations with Latin America are pragmatic, covering a broad political 
spectrum and evincing a strong focus on economic topics. But China is also pro-
jecting soft power to advance its interests in Latin America, promoting Chinese 
culture, fostering academic exchange, and welcoming future political leaders.  
 • While China has been able to take advantage of the United States’ disregard of 
Latin America, the European Union has not lived up to expectations: it neither 
concluded the negotiations of a free trade agreement with Mercosur, nor man-
aged to upgrade its existing agreements with Chile and Mexico, developments 
that had been expected to take place in 2017.
Policy Implications
Europe should take the Chinese challenge in Latin America more seriously, 
and the European Union should engage more with Latin America and develop 
a clear strategy. Concluding and improving upon free trade and cooperation 
agreements with Latin America should be a high priority. Latin American and 
Caribbean governments are interested in creating a win-win situation and co-
operating with both China and Europe. China is not displacing Europe in Latin 
America, but it is expanding into areas vacated by the European Union.   
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China Has an Eye on Latin America
At the end of Barack Obama’s tenure as US president, Miami Herald columnist An-
drés Oppenheimer (2016) wrote, “So far, Xi has visited 10 Latin American countries 
since he took office three years ago, almost as many as the 11 [visited] by President 
Barack Obama during his eight years in office.” After the election of Donald Trump, 
Chinese president Xi Jinping lost no time capitalising on the opportunity of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Lima in November 2016 to 
present himself as a defender of free trade against the protectionist threats of the 
incoming US president. The Financial Times published an article titled, “Trump 
builds walls, Xi builds bridges in LatAm” (Gallagher 2016a). During his third visit 
to Latin America since becoming president in 2013, Xi Jinping not only made a 
stopover in Peru but also travelled to Ecuador and Chile. During those visits, he 
announced the establishment of comprehensive strategic cooperative partnerships 
with both countries. Hence, Ecuador and Chile have been promoted to the same 
level of partnership as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru. 
In November 2016 the Chinese government, replacing a document from 2009, 
published a policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean that updates the strat-
egy for the region. From the document it can be gleaned that China strives to make 
headway in Latin America. China’s demand for natural resources fuelled the com-
modities boom in Latin America (2004–2013). From a Latin American perspec-
tive, China’s growing economic presence in Latin America has stabilised the region 
more than its relations with other international partners (Gomis 2017). But China 
also supported Latin America (for example, as a lender) in the period of economic 
downturn, and it is keen to expand its influence now that Latin America is recuper-
ating from recession. By chance, the second China–CELAC forum in Santiago de 
Chile was set for a date when Latin American economies were recovering, when the 
United States was alienating its Latin American partners, when EU–Latin Ameri-
can relations were stuck due to internal conflicts in Latin America, and when only 
incremental advances were being made in bi-regional trade negotiations.
More Than One Triangular Relation
US politicians and researchers like to describe the economic and political advances 
of China in Latin America from the perspective of a triangular relationship with 
a still-dominant role for of the United States. Renowned China specialist Kevin 
Gallagher (2016b) argued that Latin America has to navigate through the “China 
triangle,” where the United States possesses comparative advantages. His main ar-
guments are that the manufacturing sectors in Latin America are much more in-
tegrated with US value chains than with Asian value chains, and that the United 
States imports a higher percentage of manufactured products from Latin America; 
moreover, US FDI in the region is much more diversified than China’s in regard to 
economic sectors. Gallagher’s book does not mention Europe even once, as it is, 
from this US perspective, not an actor of relevance in Latin America compared to 
China and the United States.
This US view of its former “backyard” is definitively distorted. The Euro pean 
Union might have lost some of its glamour, but Europe is still present in Latin 
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America; indeed, some analysts (Gomis 2017) argue for the existence of a triangular 
relationship between China, Europe, and Latin America. Moreover, Asia is not only 
China – particularly Japan, but also South Korea and, to a certain extent, Taiwan, 
have strong economic links with Latin America as well. Additionally, India may 
become another important partner of Latin America in the future. Furthermore, 
the current multipolar world gives more leeway than a strictly bipolar one would to 
regional middle powers in Latin America for cross-regional relations, as is evident 
in the case of the member countries of the Pacific Alliance (Garzon and Nolte 2018) 
reaching out to Asia. On 22 January 2018, the day the China–CELAC forum ended, 
the Japanese prime minister announced that, in March of this year, 11 countries – 
including Chile, Mexico, and Peru – will sign the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11), which will include neither China 
nor the United States. 
While the United States has been experiencing a significant reduction of its par-
ticipation in Latin American trade since around the turn of the millennium (from 
56 per cent of Latin American exports in 2001 to 46 per cent in 2016; and from 46 per 
cent of Latin American imports in 2001 to 32 per cent in 2016) (Novak and Nami-
has 2017), it is still Latin America’s most important trade partner, which is thanks 
to the United States’ strong trade links with Mexico and Central America. But US 
comparative advantages in Latin America might become mitigated by US president 
Donald Trump’s protectionist policies and by changing Chinese investment pat-
terns. In contrast to the Chinese charm offensive, the US government is not show-
ing any major interest in Latin America. In his first year, President Trump did not 
visit Latin America; if, as has been speculated, he ends up skipping the next Summit 
of the Americas in Lima in April 2018, he would be the first US president since the 
establishment of this format to do so. US secretary of state Rex Tillerson set the 
example when he declined to participate in important foreign minister meetings 
within the framework of the Organization of American States (for example, those 
in which policies to confront the Venezuelan crisis were discussed). Moreover, in 
the year since his inauguration, Trump has failed to appoint an assistant secretary 
of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs. What is worse, the current US adminis-
tration has pursued a purely “negative agenda” (Oppenheimer 2017) against Latin 
America, opposing trade liberalisation and immigration, and denigrating “illegal 
immigrants” as criminals and rapists. Therefore, it is no surprise that Trump has 
become the most unpopular president in recent times in Latin America, far outpac-
ing even George W. Bush in this regard (Latinobarometro 2017).      
This shift in US Latin America policy might represent a chance for Europe to 
improve its position and regain terrain in Latin America. After the inauguration 
of President Trump, there were expectations and announcements that the Euro-
pean Union would strive to renew and update the existing agreements with Chile 
and Mexico and sign a new free trade agreement with Mercosur before the end of 
2017. But this target was missed. Moreover, the EU–CELAC summit scheduled for 
October 2017 had to be postponed due to the conflicts between the Latin American 
governments on how to confront the Venezuelan crisis.
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China Is Advancing in Latin America, but Europe Is Still There
While China and the European Union are competing in Latin America, they are also 
important trade partners. In 2016, 20.1 per cent of EU imports came from China, 
and 9.7 per cent of EU exports went to China. EU trade volume with China exceeded 
514 billion EUR, more than twice that of EU trade with Latin America (more than 
196 billion EUR), with a high deficit in the trade balance for the European Union. 
More than 90 per cent of trade is in manufactures. By contrast, 5.3 per cent of total 
EU imports came from Latin America, and 6.1 per cent of total EU exports were des-
tined for Latin America, resulting in a small positive trade balance for the European 
Union. Two-thirds of EU imports from Latin America were primary products, and 
almost 90 per cent of EU exports to the region were manufactured goods (EU Com-
mission 2017a). In the case of China, the relationship is similar: Of Latin American 
exports to China, 72 per cent are products from primary sector, and approximately 
90 per cent of Latin American imports from China are manufactured goods. In 2016 
Latin America received 5.4 per cent of China’s total exports, and contributed 6.4 per 
cent to total Chinese imports (CEPAL 2018).    
In the period from 2001 to 2016, trade between China and Latin America in-
creased by 16 times. In only 10 years – between 2001 and 2010 – exports (value) 
from China surpassed European exports to Latin America; it is possible that China’s 
share in Latin American imports (2016: 18 per cent) will increase even more in the 
future. By contrast, the percentage of Latin American imports coming from Europe 
has not shown much variation over the past 10 years (approximately 14 per cent). 
Compared with 2001, Europe’s share (as a percentage) in Latin American exports 
has diminished – but not very much (to 11 per cent in 2016), and it is still a little bit 
higher than China’s (9 per cent) (Novak and Namihas 2017). 
So far, China has not really displaced Europe in terms of Latin American trade, 
but this might change in the future as a result of the strong increase of Chinese–
Latin American trade. After a four-year-long contraction of Latin American exports 
to China, Latin American exports recovered in 2017. Trade statistics from the Inter-
American Development Bank (2017) show a growth of Latin American exports to 
China in 2017 by 30 per cent – but a raise of only 10 per cent to each the United 
States and Europe. If preliminary data for 2017 proves indicative, total trade with 
China might nearly recover its maximum value, reached in 2013 (CEPAL 2018: 39).
While China has displaced Europe as the second-most important trade partner 
of Latin America, Europe still holds the upper hand as the principal investor in 
Latin America. Moreover, European investments in Latin America are much higher 
than European investments in China. Between 2012 and 2015, European direct in-
vestment flows to Latin America totalled 363 billion EUR; in the same period, Euro-
pean companies invested 89 billion EUR in China (including Hong Kong) (euro-
stat 2017a). In 2015 the accumulated stock of European FDI in Latin America was 
nearly 1.3 trillion EUR compared to an investment stock of nearly 168 billion EUR 
in China (eurostat 2017b). 
Latin America is not a major destination of Chinese FDI; in 2015/16 the re-
gion had only a 4 per cent share in Chinese transnational mergers and acquisitions 
(CEPAL 2018: 53). While Chinese companies have invested over 110 billion USD 
in Latin America since 2003, mostly between 2015 and 2016 (Avenado et al. 2017), 
it is still lagging behind Europe and other important investor countries. In regard 
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to the FDI stock in Latin America, the most recent statistics (from 2015) provided 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2017: 57) do not 
list China among the 10 most important investors, but five European countries are 
represented (Spain, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Germany). 
In 2016 only three Chinese companies participated in the 20 largest cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions of companies in Latin America and the Caribbean – this, 
in contrast to five European companies (including one from Norway) and seven 
companies from the United States (ECLAC 2017: 41). But preliminary data for 2017 
indicate a significant increase in Chinese FDI in Latin America – of approximately 
25 billion USD in investment flows, which would represent approximately 15 per 
cent of total FDI flows to Latin America (CEPAL 2018: 56).
Chinese investment in Latin America is changing, but still dominated (approxi-
mately 80 per cent) by state-owned firms. Traditionally, Chinese investment was 
concentrated in the extractive sector. Currently, though, more than half of China’s 
investment is in the service sector, mostly in transport and infrastructure, but in-
creasingly also in finance, electricity (generation and transmission), information 
and communication technology, and especially alternative energies. The automo-
tive industry is another branch targeted by Chinese investors as a strategic sector in 
Latin America (Avenado et al. 2017; CEPAL 2018). 
In contrast to its still-lightweight status as a foreign investor, China has become 
an important lender for development projects in Latin America. Between 2005 and 
2016, Chinese banks lent more than 140 billion USD to Latin American govern-
ments – the majority to Venezuela (62 billion USD) and Brazil (37 billion USD) 
– mostly for investments in infrastructure (52 per cent) and energy (31 per cent) 
(CEPAL 2018: 22-23). Chinese banks lent more to Latin America than each of the 
three big development banks (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and 
the CAF Andean Development Corporation – Development Bank of Latin America), 
and in some years even more than all of those development banks together. Em-
blematically, China will host the 60th anniversary meeting of the Inter-American 
Development Bank in 2019; it had only joined the bank in 2009 as a donor member. 
From a Latin American perspective, Chinese loans are not competing with, but 
rather complementing, loans from Western-dominated development banks or from 
Europe. Chinese loans are concentrated in specific sectors (such as mining, energy, 
construction, infrastructure, and transport) and they are granted to countries with 
no access to other loans (Novak and Namihas 2017). Moreover, China puts no pol-
itical conditionality on its loans. 
Europe, the European Union and its member countries, is still the most impor-
tant donor in development cooperation in Latin America. But European countries 
are reducing their development aid due both to budgetary restrictions and to the fact 
that many Latin American countries are moving into the category of middle- income 
economies. In the future, Europe’s withdrawal might open up new opportun ities for 
China to increase its engagement in this area (Novak and Namihas 2017).
China’s Soft Power
While currently it is contested whether authoritarian regimes exercise soft power 
or whether they use tools normally ascribed to soft power as part of their arsenal 
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of “sharp power” with the objective of penetrating and perforating the political and 
information environments in the target countries (NED 2017), I think the concept 
of soft power is more appropriate to describe the Chinese strategy. Additionally, 
Western soft power might be overrated: as one Latin American author argues, de-
veloping countries today want development, not values (Gomis 2017).
It is normal for a great power with global reach not only to project its economic 
power but also to develop a soft power strategy to attract partners and to advance its 
interests in a given world region. In an op-ed a few days before the second China–
CELAC forum, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi (2018) wrote, “To implement the 
Belt and Road Initiative, we need not just hardware support in terms of connectivity, 
but more importantly the soft support of people-to-people friendship.” The Chin-
ese strategy includes academic programmes, cultural exchange, and media projec-
tion (for example, with a growing presence of the Chinese news agency Xinhua in 
Latin America), but it also targets political leaders. The Chinese foreign minister 
highlights that his country has invited over 800 party leaders and 200 young lead-
ers from Latin American and Caribbean countries to visit China (Wang Yi 2018). 
In another declaration, he announced that China has plans to invite a further 600 
political leaders from Latin America and facilitate 6,000 governmental fellowships 
(AFP 2018). 
While China is broadening its cultural and academic links with Latin America, 
it will be quite difficult to reach the level of personal, cultural, and academic inter-
actions that link Europe and Latin America. But it is remarkable that China is also 
advancing in these areas. There are now 39 Confucius Institutes in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (10 in Brazil, 5 in Mexico, 4 in Peru), and China is also broad-
ening its knowledge about Latin America. Based on official information from the 
Chinese Ministry of Education, the Spanish-language departments in Chinese uni-
versities increased from 12 in the year 2000 to 80 in 2015, and numbers of regis-
tered students rose from around 500 to 15,000 in the same time period (Cesarin 
and Tordini 2016).  
Latin America and the Belt and Road Initiative
Latin America is on China’s radar, but it is definitively not its highest priority. While 
China is interested in advancing its economic and political interests in Latin Amer-
ica and in supporting Latin American countries when they take a more independ-
ent posture in international politics (especially in their relations with the United 
States), it is also interested in not provoking the United States in a region of high 
strategic interest. The 2017 US National Security Strategy claims that China seeks 
to pull the region into its orbit through state-led investment and loans and that 
China, together with Russia, is seeking to expand military linkages and arms sales 
across the region.
The new poster child of China, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is focused on 
“Greater Eurasia.” If this initiative gains momentum, some experts fear that Latin 
America might again become peripheralised (Abdenur and Gonzalez 2018). By con-
trast, the European Union could become the “Western anchor” and a beneficiary 
of the BRI, which might reduce transport costs and create new direct rail-freight 
routes from Europe to China (García-Herrero et al. 2017). 
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But the BRI might expand to Latin America. For President Xi, South America 
is “a natural extension of the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” (Bousquet 2017). 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela are prospective members 
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); they still have to complete the 
accession procedures and to contribute the initial capital to the institution. The 
Argentinian and Chilean presidents attended the Belt and Road Forum for Inter-
national Cooperation in Beijing in May 2017; other governments (Bolivia, Vene-
zuela) sent delegations or representatives (Brazil sent its secretary of strategic af-
fairs). During her visit, outgoing Chilean president Michelle Bachelet proposed that 
China’s government build a trans-Pacific fiber-optic internet cable linking China 
and Chile. It would be the first of its kind between Asia and South America. In the 
opinion of the Chilean president, “the cable could be considered a part of the ‘One 
Belt, One Road Initiative’ and transform the Pacific Ocean into a bridge between our 
regions” (teleSUR 2017). 
Quite importantly for the BRI, in June 2017 Panama severed diplomatic rela-
tions with Taiwan in favour of recognising China, and in November Panamanian 
president Juan Carlos Varela inaugurated Panama’s embassy in Beijing. During 
his visit, he signed various agreements and a joint declaration with his Chinese 
counterpart (Hsiang 2018). In one of the memoranda of understanding, Panama 
declares its adherence to the Chinese Silk Road Initiative, because it will enhance 
Panama’s maritime role, based around the Panama Canal as “the great connection.” 
In an op-ed a few days before the China–CELAC forum, Chinese foreign minister 
Wang Yi (2018) explicitly encouraged Latin American and Caribbean countries to 
sign Belt and Road cooperation agreements with China. The joint declaration of 
China and CELAC describes the BRI as an important opportunity to strengthen 
development cooperation; in a separate, special declaration, the foreign ministers 
of the CELAC countries emphasised their interest in participating in the initiative.
Latin American Hopes and European Worries 
A year ago, the president of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, stated in 
an interview that for him Latin America is a priority, and that it would be an error 
to back down in the face of the activities and influence of China there (EFE 2017). 
These words were meant for a Latin American audience. In reality, one has to ac-
knowledge that for European foreign policy, Latin America has not been a priority. 
Therefore, the growing presence of China in Latin America is also not of major con-
cern for European politicians. However, Latin America is also not a top priority for 
China compared with the latter’s interests elsewhere in Asia and its Belt and Road 
Initiative. From this perspective, it might be easier for Europe and China both to 
defend their interests and to find a middle ground in Latin America.
From a Latin American perspective, many governments – especially on the Pacif-
ic side of the continent – have adapted their foreign policy to the new geo- economic 
realities with China as their main trade partner and reoriented their foreign policies 
to Asia and the Pacific Rim. Other governments still bet on Europe not only as a 
balancing power against the United States (as in the 1980s and 1990s) but also as 
counterweight to China’s growing economic clout in the region. 
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When China appeared as an alternative and promising trade partner, there was 
a lot of euphoria in Latin America. But the euphoria was replaced by a more sober 
analysis and, indeed, some fears. Latin America benefitted from the commodities 
boom fuelled by high Chinese demand for Latin American raw materials. But the 
subsequent slowdown of Chinese economic growth had a negative impact on Latin 
American economies. At the same time, a debate started in Latin America – espe-
cially notable in Brazil – about the risks of a re-primarisation of the export sec-
tor. This more critical view of the structure of economic exchange between Latin 
America and China might create an opportunity for Europe to expand and deepen 
its economic cooperation with Latin America.
At an October 2015 talk at Sciences Po in Paris, former Uruguayan president 
José “Pepe” Mujica appealed to Europe to constitute a counterbalance to the in-
creasing economic influence of China in Latin America. Mujica perceives a risk that 
Latin America’s former dependence on, and subordination to, the United States 
will simply be substituted by a new dependence on, and subordination to, China. 
He also asked Europe to open the door to becoming a counterweight vis-à-vis Asia’s 
involvement with Latin America. But it seems that on the European side, Latin 
American fears have not reverberated, and China’s growing presence has not pro-
voked major concerns. China’s growing presence in Latin America has only recently 
appeared on the European radar screen. The first China–CELAC forum in January 
2015 was a turning point; there, the Chinese government announced its objective of 
investing more in Latin America, increasing trade, and opening new lines of credit. 
As a result, China’s growing presence in Latin America was a major topic during the 
EU–CELAC summit in Brussels in June 2015. But afterwards, interest waned again. 
There are not many academic studies from a European perspective that exam-
ine China’s growing economic and political clout in Latin America – even fewer 
cover the repercussions of this relationship for Europe. Not even European think 
tanks have displayed much interest in the topic, exceptions in this regard being 
the Real Instituto Elcano in Madrid (Esteban 2015; Malamud 2017); the GIGA and 
the EU-LAC Foundation (2016); and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 
which relatively recently published an interesting study (Wigell 2016). Recently, 
two studies of note were published on the Latin American side, in which China’s 
effects on relations between Latin America and Europe are analysed (Gomis 2017; 
Novak and Namihas 2017). 
From a Latin American perspective (Gomis 2017), Chinese investment and 
loans will complement but not replace European investments. The European Union 
and China will not only coexist in Latin America, but might develop some kind of 
complementary relationship in the region, with China as an important lender and 
operator of large-scale projects, and the European Union as a trade partner and pro-
vider of technical cooperation. There is a clear Latin American interest in converting 
the cooperation with China and Europe into a win-win situation for the region.  
Moreover, Chinese investments in regional infrastructures and the country’s 
growing economic clout in Latin America do not necessarily lead to a zero-sum 
game. Better infrastructure for trade within Latin America and with the rest of the 
world might also benefit European companies and create opportunities for syn-
ergies between Chinese and European players. There are examples of cooperation 
between Chinese and European companies doing business in Latin America.
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Competition, No Cause for Panic
While the third EU–CELAC summit scheduled for October 2017 had to be post-
poned indefinitely due to the ideological polarisation between Latin American 
governments, the second China–CELAC forum took place as planned at the end of 
January 2018, where the Chinese foreign minister met many of his Latin American 
counterparts. This demonstrates the dominance of economic issues in the relations 
between China and Latin America; by contrast, in European–Latin American re-
lations the common agenda is broader, including value-based issues such as the 
protection of democracy and human rights, and it is more difficult to exclude these 
topics from the agenda.
With the crisis of CELAC, Europe lacks an interlocutor who can speak for  Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Compared to Europe, the Chinese leadership has a 
huge advantage: it can develop and implement a long-term strategy without the 
coordination problems posed by bringing together 28 countries and without having 
to deal with the veto power of well-organised pressure groups such as the agrarian 
lobby in the European Union, which would complicate an agreement between the 
European Union and Mercosur, even though European consumers might prefer Ar-
gentinian and Uruguayan beef over European beef.
Europe must take into account China’s presence in Latin America. But it should 
not overestimate the weight and influence of China. While China has surpassed 
Eur ope as a commercial partner in Latin America, Europe is still the principal in-
vestor in the region. However, Chinese investment in Latin America is increasing, 
and Chinese companies are changing their investment patterns. In the future, there 
might be more competition between Chinese and European companies. Europe 
should compete with China in Latin America but also look for synergies; in add-
ition, Europe should look to act in areas of strategic interest and based on its prin-
ciples. In light of this view, it would not make sense for Europe to support and give 
a lifeline to corrupt and anti-democratic governments, as China does in Venezuela, 
or to create new dependencies by lending money in exchange for commodities.
For historical reasons, Europe’s links with Latin America are deeper and broad-
er than China’s, especially in the social and cultural realms. Moreover, there is a 
certain disenchantment with China in Latin America, and a fear that one economic 
dependency will simply be substituted for another. From this perspective, Europe 
is perceived as a counterweight. But Europe will not recover its former position in 
Latin America, and the result of the competition with China will depend largely on 
European politics. China is not displacing Europe in Latin America, but it is ex-
panding into certain areas vacated or neglected by the European Union. 
Bibliography
Abdenur, Adriana, and Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi (2018), Trans-Regional Cooperation 
in a Multipolar World: How Is the Belt and Road Initiative Relevant to Lain Amer-
ica?, Working Paper, 1/2018, London: LSE Global South Unit, www.lse.ac.uk/in 
ternational-relations/assets/documents/global-south-unit/Working-Paper-No.-1.-
2018-Adriana-Abdenur-and-Ariel-Gonz%C3%A1lez.pdf (1 February 2018). 
AFP (2018), CELAC busca subirse a ruta de cooperación comercial propuesta por 
   10    GIGA FOCUS | LATIN AMERICA | NO. 1 | FEBRUARY 2018
China, 22 January, www.telemetro.com/internacionales/Celac-cooperacion-com 
ercial-propuesta-China_0_1102090672.html (1 February 2018).
Avenado, Rolando, Angel Melguiz, and Sean Miner (2017), Chinese FDI in Latin 
America: New Trends with Global Implications, Washington and Paris: Atlantic 
Council and OECD Development Centre. 
Bousquet, Earl (2017), Will There Be a Silk Road to South America?, in: teleSUR, 
27 May, www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/Will-There-Be-a-Silk-Road-to-South-
America-20170527-0027.html (1 February 2018).
Cesarin, Sergio, and Gonzalo Tordini (2016), Poder blando e influencia, China en 
la cooperación sur-sur: objetivos y fines de los programas y proyectos de cooper-
ación internacional, in: Revista Asia América Latina, 1, 2, 105–122.
Comisión Economica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) (2018), Explo rando 
nuevos espacios de cooperación entre América Latina y el Caribe y  China, San-
tiago de Chile: CEPAL, http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/43 
213/1/S1701250_es.pdf (1 February 2018). 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2017), Foreign 
Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago de Chile: ECLAC.
EFE (2017), Tajani critica la “austeridad sola” y que se abandone Latinoamérica a 
China, 11 February, www.efe.com/efe/espana/mundo/tajani-critica-la-austeridad-
sola-y-que-se-abandone-latinoamerica-a-china/10001-3176536 (1 February 2018).
Esteban, Mario (ed.) (2015), China en América Latina: repercusiones para Es-
paña, Documento de Trabajo, 3/2015, Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano. 
EU Commission, Directorate General for Trade (2017a), European Union, Trade in 
Goods with Latin American Countries, 16 November, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111527.pdf (1 February 2018).
EU Commission, Directorate General for Trade (2017b), European Union, Trade in 
Goods with China, 17 November, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/
september/tradoc_113366.pdf (1 February 2018).
EU-LAC Foundation and GIGA (2016), China, Latin America, the Caribbean and the 
European Union: A Triangular Relationship?, Conference Proceedings, 4 Novem-
ber, Hamburg: EU-LAC, https://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/Conferen 
ceProceedings.pdf (1 February 2018). 
eurostat: Statistics Explained (2017a), Foreign Direct investment, EU-28, 2012–2015, 
April, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Foreign_
direct_investment,_EU-28,_2012%E2%80%932015_YB17.png (1 February 2018).
eurostat: Statistics Explained (2017b), Foreign Direct Investment Statistics, April, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Foreign_direct_
investment_statistics#Further_Eurostat_information (1 February 2018).
Gallagher, Kevin (2016a), Trump Builds Walls, Xi Builds Bridges in LatAm, in: Fi-
nancial Times, 16 November, www.ft.com/content/2c46625e-5270-3e65-bf7f-
2ec352530077 (1 February 2018).
Gallagher, Kevin (2016b), The China Triangle: Latin America’s China Boom and 
the Fate of the Washington Consensus, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
García-Herrero, Alicia, K. C. Kwok, Liu Xiangdong, Tim Summers, and Zhang Yan-
sheng (2017), EU–China Economic Relations to 2025: Building a Common Future, 
A Joint Report by Bruegel, Chatham House, China Center for International Econom-
ic Exchanges and The Chinese University of Hong Kong, London: Chatham House.
Garzón, Jorge, and Detlef Nolte (2018), The New Minilateralism in Regional Eco-
   11    GIGA FOCUS | LATIN AMERICA | NO. 1 | FEBRUARY 2018 
nomic Governance: Crossregionalism and the Pacific Alliance, in: Pia Riggirozzi 
and Christopher Wylde (eds), Handbook of South American Governance, Lon-
don, New York: Routledge, 173–189.
Gomis, Miguel (2017), De coexistencia a convivencia: la reformulación de las rela-
ciones América Latina y el Caribe-Unión Europea frente a China y su impacto en 
la gobernabilidad, in: Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Hubert Gehring (eds), La 
Proyección de China en América Latina y el Caribe, Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia 
Universidad Javeriana, 503–533. 
Hsiang, Antonio C. (2018), As America Withdraws from Latin America, China Steps 
In, in: The Diplomat, 4 January, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/as-america-
withdraws-from-latin-america-china-steps-in/ (1 February 2018).
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (2017), Trade Trends Estimates Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 2018 edition, Washington, DC.
Latinobarometro (2017), La era de Trump en América Latina, Santiago de Chile.
Malamud, Carlos (ed.) (2017), ¿Por qué importa América Latina?, Informe Elcano, 
21; Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano.
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (2017), Sharp Power: Rising Authori-
tarian Influence, Washington, DC.
Novak, Fabián, and Sandra Namihas (2017), La inserción de China en ALC y el 
Perú: Su impacto en la relación con la UE, Lima: IDEI-PUC and KAS.
Oppenheimer, Andrés (2016), Trump’s Negative Latin American Agenda Will Help 
China, in: Miami Herald, 21 December, www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-
columns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article121973974.html (1 February 2018).
Oppenheimer, Andrés (2017), China Is Eating America’s Lunch in Latin America – 
and Trump is helping, in: Miami Herald, 21 December, www.miamiherald.com/
news/local/news-columns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article191041634.html 
(1 February 2018).
teleSUR (2017), Could China’s “One Belt, One Road Initiative” Land in Latin Amer-
ica?, 13 May, www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Asia-and-Latin-America-Stren-
then-Economic-Ties-20170513-0003.html (1 February 2018).
The President of the United States (2017), National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, December, Washington, DC.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2017), World 
Investment Report 2017, Geneva: UNCTAD.
Wang Yi (2018), Time for Closer Partnership and Greater Cooperation through the 
China-CELAC Forum, in: The Nassau Guardian, 17 January, https://thenassau 
guardian.com/2018/01/17/time-for-closer-partnership-and-greater-coopera 
tion-through-the-china-celac-forum/ (1 February 2018).
Wigell, Mikael (2016), China’s Advance in Latin America: Geostrategic Implica-
tions for Europe, the US, and the Region Itself, FIIA Briefing Paper, 199, August, 
Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
The Author 
Prof. Dr. Detlef Nolte is the director of the GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies and 
a professor of political science at the University of Hamburg. He was the president of 
the German Latin American Studies Association (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutsche Latein-
   12    GIGA FOCUS | LATIN AMERICA | NO. 1 | FEBRUARY 2018
amerikaforschung, ADLAF) from 2010 to 2016. His research interests include pol itical 
institutions, regional cooperation, and the international relations of Latin America. 
detlef.nolte@giga-hamburg.de, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/team/nolte
Related GIGA Research 
A number of states in the “Global South,” from rising powers such as China and 
India to regional or middle powers such as South Africa and Saudi Arabia, have 
gained diplomatic visibility, economic influence, and political importance vis-à-vis 
the established powers in an increasingly multipolar world. GIGA Research Pro-
gramme 4 “Power and Ideas” analyses how the increasingly polycentric global order 
is associated with increased opportunities for interaction and more flexibility in 
terms of partner choice at the regional and international levels. GIGA Institute of 
Latin American Studies (ILAS) researchers study the relationship between Latin 
America, the United States, China, and the European Union. 
Related GIGA Publications
EU-LAC Foundation and GIGA (2016), China, Latin America, the Caribbean and the 
European Union: A Triangular Relationship?, Conference Proceedings, 4 Novem-
ber, Hamburg: EU-LAC, https://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/Conferen 
ceProceedings.pdf. 
Noesselt, Nele, and Detlef Nolte (2015), Trotz wirtschaftlicher Flaute: China zeigt 
Flagge in Lateinamerika, GIGA Focus Latin America, 7, Hamburg: GIGA, www.
giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/trotz-wirtschaftlicher-flaute-china-zeigt-
flagge-in-lateinamerika. 
Noesselt, Nele, and Ana Soliz Landivar (2013), China in Latin America: Competition 
in the United States’ “Strategic Backyard”, GIGA Focus International Edition Eng-
lish, 7, Hamburg: GIGA, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/china-in-latin-
america-competition-in-the-united-states%E2%80%99-%E2%80%9Cstrategic-
backyard%E2%80%9D.
Nolte, Detlef (2013), The Dragon in the Backyard: US Visions of China’s Relations 
toward Latin America, in: Papel Político, 18, 2, 587–598, www.giga-hamburg.de/
sites/default/files/publications/nolte_dragon.pdf.
Schüller, Margot, and Tam Nguyen (2015), Vision einer maritimen Seidenstraße: 
China und Südostasien, GIGA Focus Global, 7, Hamburg: GIGA, www.giga-ham 
burg.de/en/publication/vision-einer-maritimen-seidenstrasse-china-und-sued 
ostasien.
Schüller, Margot, and Yun Schüler-Zhou (2015), Chinas Seidenstraßen-Initiative 
trifft auf transeuropäische Infrastrukturpolitik, GIGA Focus Asia, 8, Hamburg: 
GIGA, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/chinas-seidenstrassen-initiative-
trifft-auf-transeuropaeische-infrastrukturpolitik.
Strüver, Georg (2017), China’s Partnership Diplomacy: International Alignment 
Based on Interests or Ideology, in: Chinese Journal of International Politics, 10, 
1, 31–65, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/china%E2%80%99s-partnership 
-diplomacy-international-alignment-based-on-interests-or-ideology.
   13    GIGA FOCUS | LATIN AMERICA | NO. 1 | FEBRUARY 2018
Imprint
The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the 
Internet and downloaded free of charge at www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-
focus. According to the conditions of the Creative Commons licence Attri-
bution-No Derivative Works 3.0 this publication may be freely duplicated, 
circulated and made accessible to the public. The particular conditions 
include the correct indication of the initial publication as GIGA Focus and 
no changes in or abbreviation of texts.
The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies – Leibniz-Institut für Globale und 
Regionale Studien in Hamburg publishes the Focus series on Africa, Asia, Latin America, 
the Middle East and global issues. The GIGA Focus is edited and published by the GIGA. 
The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the institute. Authors alone are responsible for the content of their articles. 
GIGA and the authors cannot be held liable for any errors and omissions, or for any con-
sequences arising from the use of the information provided.
General Editor GIGA Focus Series: Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach 
Editor GIGA Focus Latin America: Prof. Dr. Detlef Nolte
Editorial Department: Meenakshi Preisser, Ellen Baumann 
 
GIGA | Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 
20354 Hamburg 
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus  
giga-focus@giga-hamburg.de
